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Justice as Self-Transmiting Power and Just Acts in Republic 4  
Andrew Payne, Saint Joseph’s University 
Presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at meeting of the Central Division 
of the American Philosophical Association, April 1, 2011, in Minneapolis 
In his influential paper “A Falacy in Plato’s Republic,” David Sachs charged 
Plato with commiting a falacy of irelevancy.1 Plato’s Socrates is asked to show that 
justice understood as acting in conformity with conventional morality, so-caled vulgar 
justice, is beneficial to the just person. Socrates actualy demonstrates something else, 
namely that psychic justice, a state of internal harmony between parts of the soul, is 
beneficial to its possessor. A generation of Plato scholarship has reacted to Sachs’ 
reading of the Republic by using discussions of moral psychology and education 
elsewhere in the dialogue to bridge the gap between psychic justice and a conception of 
justice centered on the performance of moral actions.2 This paper presents a diferent way 
of responding to Sachs’ paper. Republic 4 contains not two but only one conception of 
justice, according to which justice is a power in the soul of individuals. Justice is a power 
whose nature it is to transmit itself to cities which achieve civic justice as they are formed 
by just individuals. Just actions which promote the good of others are the medium by 
which justice transmits itself to cities. 
It is necessary first to explain the notion of a self-transmiting power, a power 
which operates by making other things like itself. A simple example of a self-transmiting 
power is heat; anything which has heat is hot, and this quality of heat characteristicaly 
acts on other objects to make them hot as wel. As Socrates says in Book 1, the function of 
heat is to make other things hot (335d). He also describes justice as a self-transmiting 
power in Book 1 in one of the positive arguments ofered for the superiority of the life of 
the just person over that of the unjust.3 Socrates at 351b-352d claims that just people are 
1 David Sachs, “A Falacy in Plato’s Republic,” in Vlastos, ed. Plato: A Colection of Critical Essays, vol. 
II (Garden  City,  New  York:  Doubleday and  Company,  1971),  35-51.  Hereafter referred to as Sachs, 
“Falacy”. 
2 Instances of this sort of response to Sachs are found in Raphael Demos, “A Falacy in Plato’s Republic?” in 
Vlastos, ed. Plato: A Colection of Critical Essays (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company), 52-
6; Gregory Vlastos, “Justice and Happiness in the Republic,” in Vlastos, ed. Plato: A Colection of Critical 
Essays, 66-95; Richard Kraut, “Reason and Justice in Plato’s Republic,” in Lee, Mourelatos, and Rorty, eds. 
Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy, Phronesis Supplement 1(1973), 207-24; John Cooper, 
“The  Psychology  of Justice in  Plato,” American  Philosophical  Quarterly 14 (1977),  151-7;  Eric  Brown, 
“Minding the  Gap in  Plato’s Republic,”  Philosophical  Studies  117,  275-302; and  Rachel  Singpurwala, 
“Plato’s  Defense of Justice in the Republic,” in  Santas, ed. The  Blackwel  Guide to  Plato’s  Republic 
(Malden, Massachusets: Blackwel, 2006) 263-282. Notable exceptions to this body of literature are Julia 
Annas, “Plato and Common Morality,” The Classical Quarterly 28 (1978), 437-51 and Nicholas D. Smith, 
“Plato’s  Analogy  of  Soul and  State,” Journal  of  Ethics 3 (1999),  31-49,  which  do  not construe the 
arguments of Republic 4 as atempts to connect two distinct conceptions of justice. 
3 The observation that justice in Republic 1 is treated as a self-transmiting power is also found in the work of 
other scholars. See Kimon Lycos, Plato on Justice and Power (Albany, New York: State University of New 
York  Press,  1987),  103-5.  The  present claim that justice is a self-transmiting  power can  be seen as a 
reworking  of  Lycos’ claim that “Socrates ..  wants to convince  his interlocutors that there  must  be an 
‘internal’ relation between justice and power if the ordinary belief that justice is part of human excelence is 
to be rationally grounded”; Lycos, Plato on Justice and Power, 74. Sarah Waterlow, “The Good of Others 
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more powerful and capable of acting than the unjust. He asks whether there is a 
connection between the political supremacy Thrasymachus admires and justice: “Wil a 
city that becomes stronger than another have this power without justice, or is justice 
necessary for it to have this power?”4 The folowing considerations support the later 
alternative: a group of people acting for a common goal, whether as a military formation 
or even a band of thieves, wil not be able to accomplish their end if they are riven by 
injustice, the function of which (ergon, 351d8) is to produce hatred and conflicts in 
groups. Justice, on the other hand, produces concord and friendship. Since the function of 
injustice is to produce conflict, its presence in a single person wil result in that person 
losing control over himself (351d-e). The opposite occurs in the case of the just, who are 
more capable or powerful in acting. In this argument-sketch Socrates articulates the 
results of being just in terms of promoting concord and friendship within individuals. The 
groups to which these individuals belong then enjoy similar benefits. Even the deeds of a 
group of criminals must be traced back to the limited presence of justice in the individual 
criminals (352c). Apparently, justice is present at the basic level in individuals, where it 
produces its characteristic efects of concord and friendship. Justice thus present in 
individuals counteracts the hatred and conflict between individuals that is produced by 
whatever injustice infects their association. In thus counteracting conflict and hatred 
between individuals, justice produces concord and friendship at the group level. This 
short argument alows us to characterize justice at 351b-352d as a self-transmiting 
power. Justice is or has a power which generates concord and friendship within the just 
person, and these traits associated with the just person are transmited to the city or group 
to which he belongs. 
When the fuler defense of justice arives in Republic 4, we find that Socrates 
continues to describe justice as a self-transmiting power. Justice in the city is described as 
a power: “It is the power [dunamis] that makes it possible for [moderation, courage, and 
wisdom] to grow in the city and that preserves them when they’ve grown for as long as it 
remains there itself.”5 Like justice in Book 1, the justice present in the best city exists 
because justice is present in the soul of individual members of the city (435a-e). Once 
Socrates and Glaucon agree that the soul contains the same parts as the city, Socrates 
spels out what it is for a human being to be just: “Then we must also remember that each 
one of us in whom each part is doing its own work wil himself be just and do his own.”6 
Socrates concludes his search for an account of justice in the soul by asking Glaucon, 
“Then, are you stil looking for justice to be something other than this power, the one that 
produces men and cities of the sort we’ve described?”7 As in Book 1, the 
in  Plato’s Republic,” Proceedings  of the  Aristotelian  Society 73 (1972-3),  29-30  points  out that justice in 
Book  4  of the Republic is a self-propagating trait.  Rachana  Kamtekar, “The  Powers  of  Plato’s  Tripartite 
Psychology,” Proceedings  of the  Boston  Area  Coloquium in  Ancient  Philosophy 24 (2008),  127-50 
characterizes virtues in Book 4 as powers that alow the three parts of the soul to atain their best condition. 
4 351b7-9.  Al translations are  by  Grube as revised  by  Reeve in Plato:  Complete  Works, ed. John  Cooper 
(Indianapolis, Indiana:  Hacket  Publishing,  1997).  Citations  of the  Greek text are taken from Platonis 
Rempublicam, ed. Slings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) in the Oxford Classical Texts series. 
5 433b8-10 
6 441d11-e1 
7 443b4-5 
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genesis of political justice can be traced from its origin in the soul of the just person to its 
ful growth in the justice of the city. 
After Socrates and Glaucon agree at 442d8-10 that justice in the soul is no 
diferent from justice in the city, they proceed to test this account of justice by examining 
whether such a just person would be likely to commit typicaly unjust actions. This 
passage at 442d11-443b4, which I wil refer to as the test passage, plays a particular role 
in Sachs’ account of Socrates’ defense of justice. According to Sachs, for Socrates’ 
account of psychic justice to be relevant to his assigned task of defending vulgar justice, 
it must be the case that a person who exhibits psychic justice wil also exemplify vulgar 
justice. The test passage is the main text in which Plato shows an awareness of the need 
to connect psychic justice with vulgar justice: 
The passage shows that Plato supposes that the just man – as he conceives 
him – is less likely than anyone else to perform those acts, to embezzle, 
thieve, betray, behave sacrilegiously, fail to keep oaths or agreements, 
commit adultery, neglect his parents or the service he owes to the gods. 
Plato thinks the conduct of his just man, far from being at variance with 
the vulgar conception of justice, wil exemplify it.8 
But, Sachs observes, this claim that the psychicaly just man wil exemplify vulgar justice 
is only an assumption unsupported with further argument. It is an implausible assumption 
because there is nothing to prevent a psychicaly just man from commiting an act 
commonly recognized as unjust in an inteligent, courageous, and self-controled way. 
According to Sachs, the vulgar criteria of justice (not stealing, not betraying 
friends and city, not lying, avoiding disrespect to family and the gods) are mentioned in 
order to test whether the man who exhibits psychic justice wil also exemplify vulgar 
justice. The function of the test passage is to bridge the gap between psychic justice and 
vulgar justice. But if we look at the passage preceding the test passage, we find a diferent 
answer to the question of what is being tested. At 442b-d, Socrates and Glaucon agree that 
the tripartite psychology developed in Book 4 alows for convincing accounts of the four 
cardinal virtues. A person is courageous because of her spirited part’s holding on to beliefs 
about what is and is not to be feared, wise because of her rational part ruling for the good 
of the whole soul, and moderate because of the agreement between parts of the soul as to 
which part should rule. Then Socrates and Glaucon agree on a formal description, couched 
in terms that recal the tripartite structure of the city, of what it is for a human being to be 
just: “And, of course, a person wil be just because of what we’ve so often mentioned, and 
in that way. – Necessarily. – Wel, then, is the justice in us at al indistinct? Does it seem 
to be something diferent from what we found in the city? – It doesn’t seem so to me.”9 
For justice Socrates refers back to what he has “so often mentioned,” apparently the 
account of justice in a human being at 441d4-e1 according to which a person is just in 
virtue of each part of her soul doing its own work. The notion that justice amounts to each 
part doing its own has been so often mentioned because it was employed in the description 
of the best city, starting in Book 2. That each class in the city should do what it is best 
suited to do was claimed at 433a to be central to justice in 
8 Sachs, “Falacy,” 37. 
9 442d5-10 
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the city. Now at 441d Socrates asserts that the basic principle of each part doing its own 
is fundamental to psychic justice. 
The test passage provides confirmation of this theory-laden account of justice. It 
begins with the folowing proposal from Socrates: “If there are stil any doubts in our soul 
about this [i.e., whether justice in the soul is the same as justice in the city], we could 
dispel them altogether by appealing to ordinary [or vulgar, fortika] cases.”10 Just as we 
may test a proposed chemical analysis of water as composed of two hydrogen atoms and 
one oxygen atom by asking whether a mass of molecules constructed according to the 
formula H2O wil be a tasteless, colorless, potable, thirst-quenching liquid at room 
temperature, so Socrates tests the “each part does its own” formula by considering 
whether a person to whose soul this formula applies is likely to perform the acts we 
normaly associate with justice. The appeal to ordinary or vulgar cases is not a 
scientificaly precise test, because a just person may in particular cases lie or refuse to 
return deposited property to its owner (331b-e, 382c-d, 414b-415d, 459c-e). However, the 
appeal to cases of just and unjust action serves to give rough confirmation of the proposed 
definition of justice. The function of the test passage is to test the corectness of Socrates’ 
theoretical account of justice, not to show that anyone who exhibits justice according to 
this theoretical account wil also exemplify a second conception of justice. 
Although Sachs misconstrues the role of the test passage, his paper raises the 
larger issue of the proper relation between justice conceived as psychic order and the 
actions we expect a just person to perform. Socrates recommends to us a state of psychic 
order as an essential component of our happiness. It remains unclear exactly how this 
state of psychic order relates to the sorts of actions mentioned in the test passage, actions 
by which a person promotes the good of others. There must be a connection between 
justice and such action, and in addition it must be the right sort of connection. It is 
possible to act in accordance with a moral requirement of promoting the good of others 
without acting out of proper concern for this moral requirement. If psychic justice 
required its possessor merely to act in accordance with the good of others for reasons 
unknown, then we cannot yet say that a proper link between psychic justice and moral 
action has been forged. The test passage alone does not secure this link; as we have seen, 
its function is not to confirm that a person who possesses psychic justice wil also 
exemplify a distinct conception of justice centered around the performance of moral 
actions. 
As a result of forty years of Platonic scholarship, it should be clear that the 
Republic ofers ample resources for forging this connection between justice as a psychic 
state and moral action. Commentators have shown that the moral psychology and theory 
of education contained in other parts of the Republic provide suficient support for the 
claims made in the test passage.11 For instance, John Cooper focuses on the claim that the 
just person serves the form of goodness, the source of rational order, and not his own 
happiness: 
[A] just person is a devotee of the good, not his own good; and these are 
very diferent things. Knowing the good, what he wants is to advance the 
reign of rational order in the world as a whole, so far as by his own eforts, 
10 442d11-e2 
11 See the works mentioned in footnote 2. 
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alone or together with others, he can do this. He recognizes a single 
criterion of choice: What, given the circumstances, wil be most likely to 
maximize the total amount of rational order in the world as a whole?12 Cooper 
and other scholars have shown that Socrates has access to arguments which support his 
assertion in the test passage that the just person wil normaly perform stereotypicaly 
just actions.13 However, the fact that Socrates could develop such arguments does not 
show that he would in fact appeal to such arguments if asked to clarify the connection 
between psychic justice and just actions. I hope to show that Book 4 contains the 
resources for asserting an important connection between justice and just actions. 
Justice is a self-transmiting power that is based in the justice of individual souls and 
which makes the associations formed by these individuals just. This self-transmiting 
power expresses itself in the form of just action, action which promotes the good of 
others, as it makes the city just. 
To see how Plato wishes to forge the connection between justice and moral 
action, it wil be helpful to draw upon the passage 443c9-444a2: 
One who is just does not alow any part of himself to do the work of 
another part or alow the various classes within him to meddle with each 
other.. He puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the 
three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale – high, 
low, and middle. He binds together those parts and any others there may 
be in between, and from having been many things he becomes entirely 
one, moderate and harmonious. Only then does he act. And when he does 
anything, whether acquiring wealth, taking care of his body, engaging in 
politics, or in private contracts – in al of these, he believes that the action 
is just and fine that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it, and 
cals it so, and regards as wisdom the knowledge that oversees such 
actions. 
This passage asserts a distinctive connection between justice as an internal psychic 
activity and external actions afecting other persons. Being just is a particular way of 
ruling oneself and ordering the diferent parts of oneself. It is compared to musical 
harmonies between varied musical notes and the achievement of friendship with oneself; 
this comparison recals Book 1, where Socrates ascribed to justice the distinctive product 
of friendship between diferent elements of a person or group. As in Book 1, justice as a 
state of order internal to a person generates a distinctive way of acting with others. The 
just person acts in relation to others, either in acquiring money or entering private 
contracts or engaging in politics, only if these actions preserve and foster the state of 
psychic justice. 
12 John  Cooper, “The  Psychology  of Justice in  Plato,” in Reason  and  Emotion (Princeton,  New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 145. 
13 Other  works  which  describe the  philosopher-rulers  of the Republic as  motivated  by  knowledge  of the 
forms to act without special concern for their own interest include Richard Kraut, “The Defense of Justice in 
the Republic,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. Richard Kraut (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), 323-4; Kraut, “Egoism, Love, and Political Office in Plato,” Philosophical Review 82: 1973, 
330-44; Norman Dahl, “Plato’s Defense of Justice,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Review 51 (1991), 
809-834; and Nicholas White, A Companion to Plato’s Republic (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hacket Publishing 
Company, 1979), 43-54. 
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These actions are mostly of the same type as those mentioned in the test passage: 
gaining money, entering into private contracts, and engaging in political afairs involve 
the just person in dealings with others in which the good of those others is promoted. 
Acquiring money wil involve providing some good or service to others in exchange for 
money, contracts and private associations with others have their point in the provision of 
benefit for both parties, and engaging in political afairs leads to providing services to the 
city, perhaps by holding public ofice. The performance of these just actions flows from 
and preserves the justice of individual souls, and this justice of souls is also responsible 
for the justice of the cities formed by these individuals. The best city in which each class 
does its own work wil be constituted by the farmers, smiths, and carpenters of the 
money-making class who acquire money in a just manner, by auxiliaries who take up the 
political task of fighting for the city, and by guardians who exercise wisdom in directing 
these activities. The distinctive functions of these three parts of the city are mentioned in 
the discussion of just actions at 443e3-441a1, thus ensuring that a city in which these just 
actions are caried out wil be a just city. Thus, just actions serve to transmit justice from 
souls to cities. 
According to Socrates, justice as a psychic state is related to the good of others as 
a power is related to the means through which it achieves its natural result. A just city is 
the natural result of psychic justice. Promoting the good of others is a means through 
which psychic justice operates and not the defining end of psychic justice because, as 
Socrates tels us at 443e, the just person identifies just actions not as those actions which 
wil promote the good of others but as those actions which wil preserve and achieve 
psychic justice. Just actions are fine or noble, but they have this positive aspect as acts 
that lead on to more psychic justice, not simply as actions promoting the good of others. 
Yet the benefit of others is, if not the defining end of justice, stil the fiting medium 
through which justice operates. In order for justice to transmit itself from the psyche of 
individuals to the level of the city, individuals must cary out just actions. These just 
actions wil promote the good of others, and the connection between psychic justice and 
just actions wil not be accidental. At 443b1-2, Socrates asserts that the condition of soul 
of the just person, with each part doing its own task, is the cause for or reason why 
(aition) the just person wil perform the just actions mentioned in the test passage. Just 
and moral action that promotes the good of others is a way station on the road between 
justice of soul and justice in the city. 
The folowing objection must be answered. On the present account, the person 
possessing psychic justice caries out just and moral actions with the intention to promote 
justice, that is, her own psychic justice and the analogously related justice of the city to 
which she belongs. This does not yet give us the right connection between psychic justice 
and moral action. Moral action is action motivated essentialy by concern for the good of 
others, and Plato has not yet established a connection between psychic justice and this sort 
of action. To this objection Plato can reply as folows. It is false that moral or right action 
is defined essentialy by concern for the good of others; many foolish or unwise people are 
genuinely concerned to promote the good of others around them but fail miserably due to 
their lack of excelences of character such as justice and wisdom. The just person acts with 
the concern to promote justice, her own and that of the political community she supports 
by being just. If the good of others is reliably promoted in the process of transmiting 
justice from the soul of the just person to the community to which 
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she belongs, as the passage 443c-444a and the test passage assert, then enough has been done 
to secure the good of others. This is true even if promoting the good of others is an unintended 
consequence of the just person’s focus on justice understood as having and doing one’s own. 
Since the publication of Sachs’ paper, numerous scholars have looked to other sections 
of the Republic to secure the connection between being just and acting justly. These 
investigations have enriched our understanding of various facets of the dialogue. Yet precisely 
because they cal upon sections of the Republic external to Book 4, we should wonder if an 
alternative reading of the connection between justice and just action is possible, one that is 
rooted more firmly in the concepts in play in Republic 4. Such a reading is at hand if we 
explore the implications of treating justice as a self-transmiting power, one that is based in the 
justice of individual souls and which makes the associations and political communities formed 
by these individuals just. 
 
